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Few of us have the aesthetic capacities and sensibilities of the great poet Edna St. Vincent Millay, 
but she was wrong when she wrote in 1922, “Euclid alone has looked on beauty bare.” There 
was at least one other: the inestimable Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Phillip Cantor. Half a century 
earlier, Cantor had seen what David Hilbert would later describe as “Cantor’s Paradise.” The 
elegance of the diagonal argument, the awe-inspiring heights of the Alephs, and the breathtaking 
beauty of the generalized continuum hypothesis are enough to convert even the most 
compromising constructivists among us into hard-core Platonists with a zeal to rival Kurt 
Gödel’s own. This is where evidence of Intelligent Design really can be found, and Cantor saw 
the possibility of liberation, if not salvation, in the uncountable empyrean realm. It was 
irresistible.  
But what about the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem? That theorem, also from 1922, states 
that every consistent theory has a model with a countable domain, even theories like Cantor’s 
that purport to be about uncountable domains. It is a rather awkward result, but the fact that it is 
always possible to find countable models for countable axiomatizations of first-order logic with 
set theory does not mean that it is impossible to find uncountable models. On the contrary: it is 
always possible to find uncountable models, so the theorem does not mandate that we make the 
interpretive contortions necessary to make sense of the restricted quantification in the countable 
ones. We can choose to play in the other ones. We do not have to ascend into the 
nondenumerable empyrean realm, but we may, and so we do. I think the full context for Hilbert’s 
comment sums up the response of the mathematical community: “Aus dem Paradies, das Cantor 
uns geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben können” (Hilbert 1926). We can translate this fairly 
literally as, “No one must be allowed to expel us from the Paradise that Cantor has created for us,” 
but I think its spirit might be captured more succinctly and poetically as simply, “This is 
Paradise; to Hell with that!”  
There is a clear and distinct bias visible in my rendition of Hilbert’s response: a bias for 
beauty. There is ovewhelming beauty to be found in Cantor’s Paradise. We love it here; we’re 
staying; amor omnia vincit. 
Professor Mamolo has taken us on a romp into the mathematics of transfinite cardinals at 
the edge of this paradise. The challenge is to rein in the flights of poetic fancy (as I have not) and 
say something precise about the infinite. Precision is not to be confused with objectivity, but it is 
undeniably a great help in negotiating the rarefied terrains of abstract mathematics. The precise 
language of set theory is designed for the job; ordinary languages are not. That mismatch 
generates the ambiguities that give rise to conflicting intuitions, fallacious argumentation, and 
paradoxes both veridical and falsidical. 
One sort of difficulty comes into clearer focus when we consider the use of 1-1 functions 
mapping one set onto another as a measure of cardinality. That provides a precise criterion for 
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determining whether two sets are the same size, independent of the determining how large either 
set is. That is, sometimes we can answer the question, “Are they the same size?” without 
answering the question, “How large are they?” Furthermore, the possibility of putting a set into a 
1-1 correspondence with one of its own proper subsets provides an equally precise criterion for 
set infinitude. However, the possibility of putting a set, S1 into a 1-1 correspondence with a 
proper subset of S2 does not mean that S1 is smaller than S2 because it does not mean that S1 
cannot also be put into a 1-1 correspondence with S2. That needs to be kept in mind when 
dealing with infinite sets of ping-pong balls – and keeping it “in mind” is precisely right, because 
“in mind” is the only place one ever has to deal with infintely many ping-pong balls. The infinite 
does not confront us in the rec room. Listen carefully to what Mamolo said:  
 
The sets of in-going and out-going balls, being numbered as they are, both 
correspond to the set of natural numbers. This correspondence ensures that at the 
end of the experiment, as many balls were removed from the barrel as went in. 
 
Pay close attention to the exact correspondence that has been established here because there are 
many ways to puts equipollent sets into a 1-1 correspondence. The key to the paradox, as 
presented, lies in the apparently innocuous clause about the balls “being numbered as they are.” 
The numbering might have been done differently. Suppose that the balls were numbered as we 
put them in the barrel by the counting numbers starting with 1, but we renumber them as we take 
them out, again starting with 1 – but we take them out randomly, not according to their original 
numbering. We might, for example, always take out the second ball from each group of ten we 
put in the barrel. In that case, the ball originally numbered 1 would remain in the barrel until the 
very end. Infinitely many balls put in; infinitely balls taken out, but this time one remains. The 
infinite is funny that way. The mathematics is not in dispute: adding aleph-null many elements – 
the cardinality of the counting numbers – to a set that already has aleph-null elements always 
results in a set with aleph-null elements, but taking away aleph-null elements from a set with 
aleph-null elements can result in a set with a cardinality anywhere between zero and aleph-null 
itself. The mathematical operation of subtraction is undefined on Cantor’s transfinite cardinals. 
The physical operation of “taking away” ping-pong balls can be defined in several ways, some of 
which depend on how the balls are numbered, and some of which – but only some – leave an 
empty barrel. In the original problem, all the noise about putting balls into the barrel is a 
distraction: there are infintely many balls labelled 1, 2, 3, etc. Ball 1 is removed from the barrel 
at the 30-second mark; ball 2 is removed at the 45-second mark, and so on. The circuitous route 
that higher-numbered balls follow is irrelevant since the path of every numbered ball can be non-
problematically traced, and every one of those paths ends with it being removed.  
 One way to avoid the paradox of the ping-pong balls and all its confounding paradoxical 
kin about the infinite is simply deny that there is any such thing as infinty. Agree with Aristotle 
in countenancing potential infinities but not actual infinities. Better yet, follow Gersonides, a 14th 
century commentator on Aristotle, who argued that infinity is properly thought of as an adverb of 
process rather than as either a definite quantity or, worse, a substance (Rudavsky, 1998). There is 
a real insight here: after all, we can count infinitely – augmenting without end – but we cannot 
count to infinity. Zeno might divide time and space infinitely, be he cannot divide it to an 
infinitesimal. That solves the problem, but the cost is high: it casts us out of Paradise. The axiom 
of infinity, like the Continuum Hypothesis, is provably independent of the other axioms of 
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Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, so we do not have to ascend even into the lower, countable regions 
of the infinite. But as with the higher realms, we do not have to, but we may, so we do. 
 How does this relate to objectivity, bias, and argumentation? Mathematics is not just 
about purely formal, completely objective proofs. There is argumentation in mathematics 
(Aberdein 2005). It has arguments; arguments have arguers; and arguers have biases. Among 
those biases is the preference for beautiful theories, like Cantor’s set theory. Mamolo is correct 
to point out that following Cantor into the transfinite realm is not “more correct” in any objective 
sense, than adopting Robinson’s arithmetic with its nonstandard analysis as a way of allowing 
infinitesimals in the door – or, for that matter, a modern-day Gersonides who prefers a finite 
mathematical world without an axiom of infinity. But is it more beautiful? I think so, but that 
may be due to bias. Is it objectively more beautiful? There can be no such proof, but, oh, can 
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